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The chain of litigation is not a rapid conduit, but rather there are
defenses and estoppels along the way which could prevent recovery to any
one litigant in the chain. It was these very defenses as embodied in the Code
which persuaded the court in the instant case to adopt the view disallowing
any right to the drawer against the collecting bank." As a court of first
impression, it concluded that the assertion of the defenses of the drawer,ls
the collecting bank,'" and the other rights and defenses between the trans-
ferors and transferees2" would be difficult if the court allowed this suit by
the drawer.
This decision clearly adopts a view which gives no right of action to the
drawer, but more important than its following this line of authority is the
fact that the court here sets forth some sensible reasons for the rule. This is
a welcome change from the cases which, in adopting this rule, have merely
told the drawer that he should have sued his own bank. 21.
EDWARD J. MCDERMOTT
Negotiable Instruments—Holder in Due Course—Good Faith: Subjec-
tive or Objective?—Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers.' ,—Plaintiff finance
company furnished conditional sales contract and promissory note forms
to a seller of frozen food and home freezer plans. The body of the condi-
tional sales contract contained an assignment clause which in bolder type
described the finance company as the specific assignee of the seller's con-
tract rights. On the reverse side was a place designed for representations
by prospective purchasers as to their financial condition, for the purpose of
securing credit from the finance company. At one time the note and con-
tract forms were a single sheet of paper separated by a perforated line.
The seller fraudulently induced defendants to purchase a food and freezer
plan. Defendants executed a promissory note and conditional sales contract
but upon discovery of the fraud they refused to make any payments. After
repossession and sale, the finance company, as assignee of the note and
contract, sued for a deficiency judgment of $1,420.75. Defendants introduced
tion of § 3-419(1), upon which the plaintiff relied for his conversion count, on the
ground the defendant was not a "payor bank" as defined in § 4-105(b). It also recog-
nized that although the collecting bank may be liable in conversion to a proper party,
subject to denfenscs, e.g., under § 3-419(3), there was no explicit provision within the Code
which determined to whom the collection bank was liable. Thus the drawer's right of
action must be found outside the Code.
17 "The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code opens the road for the
adoption of what seems the preferable view." 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1273, 184 N.E.2d
at 362.
18 UCC §§ 3-406 & 4-406.
UCC § 4-406(5).
20 UCC §§ 3-417 & 4-207.
21 It has been indicated that a court in a jurisdiction which has allowed a cause of
action to the drawer against the collecting bank may still do so in spite of UCC
§ 4-406(5). Clarke, Bailey & Young, Bank Deposits and Collections 165 (1959) ; Bailey,
Brady on Bank Checks 512 (3d ed. 1962).
74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (1962).
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no evidence that plaintiff lacked actual good faith or had knowledge of the
particular fraud at the time of the assignment, but did claim the defenses
of fraud in the inducement and failure of consideration. HELD: Judgment
for defendants. The finance company, by its actions and knowledge of the
situation prevailing here and in similar freezer deals, and by furnishing its
selected seller with an instrument which, for all practical purposes, could
be negotiated only to itself, became so inextricably a part of the particular
freezer deal with defendants that it cannot later claim the protection of
a holder in due course in good faith.
Careful scrutiny of the facts is essential to an understanding of the
decision. The finance company had engaged in a series of similar transac-
tions with the seller, supplying the blank forms and purchasing the completed
notes and contracts from the seller shortly after the sale. This provided
necessary credit to the seller enabling it to carry out its operations and
provided a profitable investment for the finance company. The seller and
several other organizations involved in the fraudulent food and freezer deals
were located in Wayne, New Jersey, "miles away"2 from the finance com-
pany in Westfield, New Jersey. Despite the court's implication to the con-
trary, there was no finding that the finance company had actual knowledge
of the fraudulent scheme and consequent lack of subjective good faith. The
court used the following evidence to impute lack of good faith to the finance
company:
(a) That as a dealer in this paper it must have known that "repre-
hensible practices in the sale of these freezers had become a matter of public,
judicial and legislative concern; "3
(b) That a single constable operating in Wayne had repossessed 300
to 500 freezers a year. The court felt this was
. . . evidence of a prevailing situation which should have served to
put the plaintiff on its guard to inquire of its own constable, if he
was Westfield's, or of the dealers, or of the defaulting purchasers
to discover the reason for these amazing defaults. 4
There was no finding that the constable mentioned was Westfield's, or that
all the repossessions were made by or on behalf of Westfield, or that the
repossessed freezers were originally sold by the seller here involved, or
financed by Westfield;
(c) That the finance company supplied the note and contract forms,
as discussed above. The note on which this action was founded was appar-
ently an ordinary promissory note no different in form from the thousands
which pass in commerce every day.
None of these factors is more than "suspicious circumstances" and is
not evidence tending to show actual knowledge or lack of subjective good
, 	 2 	Id. at	 590, 181 A.2d at 818.
3 Id. at 590, 181 A.2d at 811.
4 Id. at 590, 181 A.2d at 818.
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faith. Thus the court, in precluding the finance company from holder-in-due-
course status, has used a purely objective test for good faith r,
Although this case was decided under the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (NIL),° the court quoted from the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), section 3-302(0, 7 thereby implying that the result under the Code
would have been the same, i.e., that the test for good faith is objective under
either statute.
In so holding the court has departed from prior New Jersey decisions
construing the NIL, which adopted the subjective good faith test for a
holder in due course. 8 Although the court did attempt to avoid the effect of
5 The court seems to disclaim use of an objective (suspicious circumstances) test
when it states (id, at 584, 181 A.2d at 814) that
. present day commercial practices require that the court inquire in a particu-
lar case as to what facts constitute more than 'merely suspicious circumstances'
affecting the 'good faith' of a bolder in due course.
But the evidence relied on is nothing more than a series of suspicious circumstances
and is not the equivalent of a finding that the finance company had knowledge of or
took part in the fraudulent transaction with defendants. This is evident from the
court's conclusion (id. at 590-91, 181 A.2d at 818):
Westfield Investment Company, not only by its actions and knowledge of the
situation prevailing here and in similar freezer deal transactions but also in
delivery to its selected dealer of an instrument which, for all practical purposes
could be negotiated only to it, became so inextricably a part of the original
transaction with the purchaser that it could not thereafter stand aloof in the
role of a holder in due course in good faith. (Emphasis by the court.)
6
 The applicable sections are the following: N.J. Stat. Ann. (1937):
§ 7:2-52. A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument
under the following conditions:
HI. That he took it in good faith and for value;
IV. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
[NIL § 52.]
§ 7:2-56. To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is
negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to
bad faith. [NIL §
7
 Id. at 585, 181 A.2d at 815. The UCC became effective in New Jersey January 1,
1963. UCC § 3-302(1) states in part:
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(b) in good faith;
Good faith is defined in UCC § 1-201(19) as:
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.
8 Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201 (1952) ; Rice
v. Barrington, 75 N.J.L. 806, 70 Atl. 169 (1908); Joseph v. Lesnevich, 56 N.J, Super.
340, 153 A.2d 349 (1959). The court in the Driscoll case, interpreting NIL § 59, supra
note 6, states at 480, 86 A.2d at 224:
our courts have consistently adhered to and frequently quoted the rule expressed
in Rice v. Barrington . . . :
. . . proof of circumstances calculated merely to arouse suspicion will
not defeat recovery on a negotiable note taken for value before maturity.
Bad faith, i.e., fraud, not merely suspicious circumstances, must be brought
home to a holder for value whose rights accrued before maturity, in order
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these decisions, the attempt failed as no evidence of anything other than
suspicious circumstances was unearthed,° certainly not the "bad faith, i.e.,
fraud . . ." required by Rice v. Barrington.'
The court's assumption that an objective test for good faith was in-
corporated into Section 3-302(1) of the UCC seems equally questionable.
As originally drafted, section 3-302(1) (b) required "observance of the
reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the holder may
be engaged.'"' Pennsylvania, which, like New Jersey, had previously applied
a subjective test for good faith, 12 originally enacted the section in that
form" and the Pennsylvania Bar Association stated: "The requirement of
the observance of the reasonable commercial standards of a business changes
the law from subjective good faith, by adding an objective test. 714
However, the provision for "reasonable commercial standards" was
omitted in later versions of the UCC," due largely to the studies made by
the New York Law Revision Commission, and Pennsylvania amended its
statute accordingly) The memorandum submitted to the Law Revision
Commission by counsel for the Chase National Bank clearly illustrates the
basis for objection to an objective test:
[I]n this most important aspect of commercial paper the code
either expressly or through the ambiguity of the 'reasonable com-
mercial standards' phrase in 3-302 definitely opens the prospect of
a return to the doctrine of Gill v. Cubitt" which . . . resulted in
such discredit of Bank of England bills on the European continent
and complaints of the mercantile community, as to lead subsequent
English courts and the NIL itself to adopt the doctrine of good
faith and actual notice." (Footnotes added.)
to defeat his recovery on a negotiable note upon the ground of fraud in its
inception or between the parties to it.
See 2d Report, New Jersey Commission on the U.C.C. 267 (1960).
See note 5 supra.
10 Supra note 8.
11 See 1952 Official Draft of the UCC § 3-302(1)(b). This section is quoted in
the instant case, supra note I, at 584, 181 A.2d at 814.
12 First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 340, 17 A.2d 377, 379 (1941), where
the court stated:
To defeat the rights of one dealing with negotiable securities it is not enough
to show that he took them under circumstances which ought to excite the
suspicion of a prudent man and cause him to make inquiry, but that he had
actual knowledge of an infirmity or defect, or of such facts that his failure to
make further inquiry would indicate a deliberate desire on his part to evade
knowledge because of a belief or fear that investigation would disclose a vice
in the transaction.
13 Pa. Laws 1953, ch. 3, § 3-302(1)(h). This was amended by Pa. Laws 1959, ch.
1023, § 3, which deleted the "reasonable commercial standards" language.
14 Pa. Bar Ass'n Notes, Pa. Stat. Ann, tit. 12A, § 3-302, at 524 (1954).
15 Supra note 7
15 Supra note 13.
17 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824). The "suspicious circumstances" test
for good faith first laid down in this case was forcefully laid to rest in England
only 12 years later by Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870, III Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836).
18 Memorandum of Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley on Article 3 of the UCC,
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In a meticulous study of the consequences of the original UCC Section
3-302, the New York Law Revision Commission concluded that under the
New York NIL"
.. the New York courts could conceivably find that a party was a
holder in due course, who (a) had subjective good faith, (b) was
not guilty of (i) subjective or (ii) objective bad faith, but (c) did
not act in such a way that he could affirmatively be said to have
had objective good faith. In other words, his conduct might fail to
meet the reasonable commercial standards of his business (objective
good faith), and yet not be so bad as to amount to objective bad
faith„ . . But under the 1952 draft of the Code this would not
have been possible."
This is as dear a statement as can be found of the underlying factors
implicit in the subjective test for good faith—the doctrine of "the white
heart and the empty head," 2 ' or as it has also been called, the "blundering
fool"22 doctrine. The Commission Report then continues:
The Supplement No. 1 revision deleting the controversial ref-
erence to 'reasonable commercial standards,' eliminates all this
controversy and restores to Section 3-302(1) (b) the present N.I.L.
language. 23
In the New Jersey study of the UCC," the following comments appear con-
cerning section 3-302:
The Code basically seems to follow this 'white heart' (sub-
jective) test of good faith. It does, however, list some suspicious
circumstances (`red lights') which prevent a person from becoming
a holder in due course, regardless of the actual state of mind at
the time he acquired the instrument. These suspicious circumstances
are listed in section 3-302(3) of the Code."
New Jersey follows the 'white heart' or 'subjective' test of
1 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission 198, 204 (1954).
10 The New York statute has provisions substantially similar to §§ 52 and 56 of
the NIL, supra note 6.
25 2d Report of the New York Law Revision Commission 904-05 (1955).
21 Note, 53 Harv, L. Rev. 1200 (1940).
22 Schintz v. American Trust & Say. Bank, 152 Ill. App. 76, 78 (1900), where
the court states: "A blundering fool may therefore be found to have acted in good
faith, though under like circumstances a shrewd business man might be deemed to
have acted in bad faith."
23 Supra note 20, at 907.
24 2d Report, New Jersey Commission on the UCC (1960). In the letter of trans-
mittal to the study the Chairman of the Commission states at p. v:
In the study that follows there has been collected in one place and for the
first time an unparalleled analysis of commercial law and practice. No other
of the United States has a more complete collection in one volume of its own
commercial law and practice.
The court in the instant case apparently ignored this extensive study. Certainly no
reference was made to it.
25 Id. at 266.
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good faith.. .. Therefore, New Jersey law is in accord with the
basic notion of 'good faith' set out in section 3-302 of the code. 26
Thus it is apparent that the court in the instant case has gone against the
clear holdings of prior cases in New Jersey and other neighboring states in
its construction of Sections 52 and 56 of the NIL,27 and is inaccurate in its
implication that the UCC would require a similar result.
The ultimate reason for this apparent limitation on the Rice doctrine
is the court's adamant refusal to let the finance company recover against
an innocent purchaser in the face of unquestionable fraud and unscrupulous
tactics employed by the seller, even though the finance company acted in
actual good faith. This fact is apparent from the following statement by
the court:
If it is eager to deal with business firms at all, a financing company
should not be permitted to choose carelessly, without some inves-
tigation of the vendor, or once having had notice of a vendor's
unscrupulous tactics, it should not let it pass unnoticed whereby
the customer becomes endangered. . „ If it has chosen carelessly
or has noticed the employment of dciubtful business ethics, the
financing company should not be allowed to hide behind the holder
in due course cloak and thumb its nose at the consumer public.
The choice which a financing company exercises should not be a
choice devoid of responsibility for its selection. 28 (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
This decision has far-reaching implications, not the least of which is
that it directly opposes the manifest legislative intent to further the trans-
ferability of negotiable instruments by providing a subjective test for good
faith.
Conditional sales, with resultant arrangements between financial insti-
tutions and sellers such as here involved, are the backbone of our modern
credit economy. If, as this court suggests, 29 so basic a change is required
213 Id. at 267.
27 Supra note 6.
28 Supra note 1, at 588-89, 181 A.2d at 817.
29 Id. at 586, 181 A.2d at 815, where the court quotes the following language from
the nearly identical case of Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953):
It may be that our holding here will require some changes in business
methods and will impose a greater burden on finance companies. We think the
buyer—Mr. & Mrs. General Public—should have some protection somewhere
along the line. We believe the finance company is better able to bear the risk
of the dealer's insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position to protect
his interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers.
In a note on that and other cases in 34 Ore. L. Rev. 262 (1955) the following appears
at 266-67:
If these cases do not turn on actual notice or a return to the suspicious-
circumstances rule, have the courts based their decisions upon a desire to protect
someone who is at a disadvantage? This is suggested in the Martin case • • But
this is a dangerous idea. Its adoption would allow the court to become the sole
arbiter of the person best able to bear the risk. It would allow the court to
decide in each and every case, regardless of the bona fides of the holder, who
should suffer. This would completely demolish all progress so painstakingly
made in the law of bills and notes.
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in our policy toward conditional sales in order to protect the innocent pur-
chaser, that change should come from the policy-making body—the legis-
lature—either by a return to an objective test for good faith by adopting the
"reasonable commercial standards" language of the 1952 draft of the UCC,
or by adopting a Retail Instalment Sales Act. 3° Otherwise, every finance
company or other financial institution engaged in furthering conditional
sales by such arrangements with sellers will be relegated to the duty of
inquiring in each and every case whether the purchaser has any defenses
against the instrument, or in the alternative, to taking its chances that
there are no defenses. 31 Either way, the financial institution will incur
substantially increased expenses, in making inquiry on the one hand, or in
costs of litigation and losses on the other, which will undoubtedly be handed
down to the consumer in the form of higher finance charges.
In recent years the volume of cases involving this issue has greatly
increased. A significant number of jurisdictions governed by the NIL have
reached the same result as the court in the instant case,32 although appar-
ently the issue has not yet come before the courts in any jurisdiction in
which the current version of Section 3-302(1) (b) of the UCC33 , was in
effect on the date of the transaction. 34 These decisions have been uniformly
30 See III. Laws 1933, § 1, at 716, as amended, Ill. Laws 1955, § 1, at 781; this
statute was repealed by the legislature upon the enactment of the UCC, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
26, § 10-102 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Symposium, VI. Finance Companies and Banks as
Holders in Due Course of Consumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw, U. L. Rev. 389,
396 (1960) ; Model Retail Instalment Sales Act, § 13, 3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 437,
452 (1962):
Section 13. Separate Notes.
If, as part of any instalment sales transaction, a note is taken evidencing
the instalment buyer's obligations under a retail instalment sales agreement, such
note shall refer to the retail instalment sales transaction out of which it arose
and any holder of such note shall be subject to all defenses which the instal-
ment buyer may assert against the instalment seller . . .
See also Note, 34 N.C.L, Rev. 496 (1956), for conclusion that such statutes lack desirable
flexibility.
31 Note, Relation Between Bad Faith and Notice under the NIL, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev.
617, 624 (1933):
Even though it has been uniformly held that mere suspicious circumstances do
not impose the duty of inquiry, under the objective test, there would, in practical
effect, be imposed upon the holder such duty of inquiry in every'case, for fear
that a jury may find that under the circumstances a reasonable man would have
had bad faith.
32 Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940), noted in
53 Harv. L. Rev. 1200 (1940) & 34 Ore. L. Rev. 262 (1955); Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950), noted in 34 Ore.
L. Rev. 262 (1955) ; Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, supra note 29; Whitfield v, Carolina
Hsg. & Mtge. Corp., 243 N.C. 658, 92 S.E.2d 78 (1956), noted in 34 N.C.L. Rev. 496
(1956). Contra, Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657
(1954), reh. denied, 268 Wis. 164, 67 N.W.2d 873 (1955), noted in 39 Minn. L. Rev.
775 (1955).
33 Supra note 7.
34 See Hogan v. Metropolitan Food Plan, Inc., no. 881, Munic. Ct. of Phila., Dec.
16, 1958, noted in 33 Temp. L.Q. 114 (1959). This case involved a food and freezer deal
and facts very similar to those in the instant case. It arose under Section 3-302(1) (b)
of the UCC as originally enacted in Pennsylvania, including the "reasonable commercial
standards" test. The court granted the purchaser rescission of the contract on the theory
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predicated, as in the instant case, on the fact that the finance company is
better able to bear the risk than is the innocent purchaser, the courts
thereby ignoring or discarding both precedent and statutory language which
require a contrary result. Some cases show clearly that the finance com-
pany, in its dealing with the seller, had actual knowledge of the fraudulent
scheme." In such an event the UCC unequivocally excludes it from holder-
in-due-course status since the subjective test for good faith is not satisfied.
But short of a finding of actual knowledge and in the absence of a governing
statute, courts should require only a showing of subjective good faith36
 and
refrain from decisions, such as that in the instant case, which open the way
for a return to the "suspicious circumstances" test of Gill v. Cubitt."
FORREST W. BARNES
Negotiable Instruments—Stop Payment Order on a Certified Check—
Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code.—Winston v. Kasper Am. State
Bank.'—This action was brought to recover the amount of a certified check.
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, was the payee of a check dated August 31,
1956, drawn on and certified by defendant bank before delivery. Instead
of cashing the check, the plaintiff instituted an action against the drawer
for the full amount of the commission which he believed to be due him. Sub-
sequently, in May 1957, when the drawer learned that the plaintiff was not a
licensed real estate broker as required by a Chicago ordinance, he stopped
payment on the check and caused an indemnity bond to be posted. The
drawer was not a party to the present action but a petition to intervene was
filed by the assignee of one-half of the drawer's interest in the security
deposit held by the casualty company. On June 30, 1960 the plaintiff
that defendant finance company was not a holder in due course. The author of the note
disagreed with the decision even under an "objective test" for good faith.
35 See G.M.A.C. v. Daigle, 225 La. 123, 72 So. 2d 319 (1954), noted in 53 Yale L.J.
877 (1955)
36
 See note, 33 N.C.L. Rev. 608, 613 (1955), where the following comment appears:
If, in fact, there is present a situation so fraught with the possibility of
fraud or unfairness that the statutory provisions of the NIL are not adequate,
then it seems that legislation is the only sound solution. Nothing but uncertainty
can arise out of an encroachment upon these statutory provisions by judicial
decisions. Undoubtedly this situation presents a ripe' opportunity for collusion
between unscrupulous finance companies and dealers to take advantage of the
buyer. Clearly in some cases the finance company has actually participated in
the transaction to such an extent that it cannot be a holder in due course within
the statutory provisions. But in other cases there is no evidence of such direct
participation in the transaction by the finance company as would charge it with
`actual notice' or bad faith as required by the NIL. In the absence of additional
legislation, it is submitted that innocent finance companies that come within the
definition of holder in due course under the existing statutes, should not be
deprived of that position because of a tendency of the courts to 'catalogue' them
in the same class with unscrupulous companies by the indiscriminate or deliberate
use of such terms as 'close connection.'
37 Supra note 17.
1
 184 N.E.2d 725 (III. App. 1962), appeal denied by Sup. Ct. of Ill., Nov. 28, 1962.
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